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Case No. 20170518-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

TRACY SCOTT,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
INTRODUCTION
Defendant shot his wife three times at point-blank range, killing her.
He never disputed that he fired the fatal shots. Instead, his defense at trial
was that the jury should convict him of manslaughter because he shot his
wife under extreme emotional distress: Their contentious relationship, along
with a recent escalation in tensions, allegedly caused him to snap. He
testified that in the weeks before the shooting, he and his wife had been
fighting worse than ever; that his wife threatened him days earlier; and that
when he saw her gun was missing from the gun safe, he was overwhelmed
with fear and anger. He was convicted of murder.
Defendant testified that three days before he killed his wife, she had
threatened him, and that when he saw her by their gun safe and noticed that
a Beretta was missing, he took the threat seriously and believed that she

meant to harm him. When Defendant tried to testify about the exact words
of his wife’s alleged threat, however, the State objected that those words were
inadmissible hearsay. Defense counsel did not counter that the exact words
were admissible non-hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of
the matter asserted. The trial court sustained the State’s objection, so the jury
never heard the alleged threat’s exact words.
On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for not
making the non-hearsay argument. The court of appeals agreed, reasoning
that defense counsel was deficient because admitting the specific words of
the threat—which are not part of the record—would only have strengthened
his defense. The court of appeals also held that Defendant was prejudiced
because the jury may have remained deadlocked had it heard the threat’s
specific words, which again, are not part of the record.
The court of appeals erred and this Court should reverse. First, the
court of appeals failed to hold Defendant to the Strickland deficient
performance standard, under which the determinative question is whether
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable. Because the court of
appeals failed to conduct this analysis, and thereby incorrectly concluded
that counsel was deficient, it erred. Likewise, the court of appeals’ conclusion
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that counsel performed deficiently was not supported by the record because
the specific words of the threat were not in the record.
The court of appeals also erroneously concluded that Defendant was
prejudiced. Without knowing the content of Teresa’s alleged threat, the court
of appeals impermissibly speculated that the content of the threat was both
serious and would have affected the outcome of the proceeding. Also, the
court of appeals did not evaluate the totality of the evidence before the jury,
but instead considered evidence of Teresa’s alleged threat in isolation.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the court of appeals apply an incorrect standard for determining
whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?
2. Did the court of appeals incorrectly relieve Defendant of his burden
to prove Strickland prejudice as a demonstrable reality on the record
evidence?
Standard of Review for Issues 1 and 2. On certiorari, this Court reviews a
court of appeals’ decision for correctness. State v. Lowther, 2017 UT 34, ¶17,
398 P.3d 1032.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.1
When teenaged brothers Jack and John learned that there were police
cars in front of their Salem, Utah home, their first thought was that their
father, Defendant, had “finally” killed their mother, Teresa. R.279:100, 108,
124. They were right. Defendant had just called 911 to report that he had shot
and killed his wife. R.280:62; State’s Ex.1. When the dispatcher asked what
had happened, Defendant calmly explained that he shot Teresa after she “got
off the phone with her mother complaining about” Defendant, “telling how
she’s tired of it and this and that.” R.280:63; State’s Ex.1. Defendant said that
he and Teresa had “been fighting for the last two weeks, almost straight,” and
that Teresa had been “trying to take a picture” of him. R.280:63-64; State’s
Ex.1. But now, Defendant told the dispatcher, Teresa was dead. R.280:64;
State’s Ex.1.
Responding officers found Teresa in the master bedroom sitting on the
bed, semi-reclined. R.277:131. Her legs were before her, her slippered feet

1

The State uses the pseudonyms “Jack” and “John” for the children’s

names.
The record is paginated in chronological order, but in reverse. The
transcripts, however, are paginated in ascending order. The State’s brief uses
the order in which they appear—descending in the record, ascending in the
transcripts.
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crossed at the ankle. Id. Her cell phone was next to her and crochet work lay
on her lap. Id.
Defendant had shot Teresa three times. R.277:135, 140. One bullet
entered the left corner of her mouth and lodged in her esophagus. R.278:46.
Another entered under her chin and exited the right side of her neck.
R.278:49. The third bullet entered her chest, passed through her heart, and
exited out her back. R.278:51-53. Because Teresa had gunpowder stippling
over the back of her right hand, which is caused by “unburnt gunpowder
particles as they come out of the muzzle of the gun,” the medical examiner
concluded that Teresa had been shot from a couple feet away. R.278:54, 64.
Officers recovered two guns from the home. The one Defendant used
to shoot Teresa, a black handgun, was lying on the floor near the front door.
R.277:45-46, 87, 116, 146, 150-152, 179, 186-187; State’s Exs. 5-7. They found
another gun, a loaded silver Beretta, in the master bedroom lying on the
lower right corner of the bed—the far opposite corner from where Teresa had
been sitting. R.277:125, 134, 137-138; State’s Ex.9-10. A holster lay on top of
it. R.277:135, 160-161; State’s Ex.10.
Officers also found a portable gun safe in the master bedroom “poking
out underneath the dresser” near the bedroom door. R.277:125-126; State’s
Ex.11. It was “open, nothing in it.” R.277:126, 171.
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A history of domestic violence
At trial, the State presented evidence that Defendant and Teresa had a
difficult relationship, characterized by Defendant emotionally and physically
abusing Teresa.
Defendant and Teresa had been married nineteen years. R.278:86, 134.
During that time, Defendant worked full-time fixing school buses for the local
school district. R.278:213-214. Teresa worked part-time cleaning houses, at
Wal-Mart, and with her parents. R.278:94-95; R.279:47. Teresa also took care
of their home and their two boys, Jack and John, and managed their finances.
R.278:92-94, 140, 147-148. Teresa had gone back to school and earned a
business degree, but she had yet to find a steady, full-time job. R.278:92-94,
140, 147. And while friends and family knew that Defendant and Teresa
argued often—usually about finances—they believed it was no more than
“any other married couple.” R.278:195-196, 202-206, 211, 215-217; 279:42, 48,
65, 119.
Jack and John, however, knew that things were worse than that. Things
at home were “rocky and rough.” R.279:77. They witnessed many fights, and
believed Defendant was “responsible” for most of them. R.279:127. While
Teresa would get mad and yell, Defendant got “aggressive” and “physical.”
R.279:82, 90-91. Once they saw Defendant throw a towel at Teresa’s face and

-6-

start “punching her in the gut.” R.279:90-91, 116. Another time Defendant
“slammed” the vacuum into Teresa’s legs. R.279:118. But they never saw
Teresa “get physical” with Defendant. R.297:91. Nor did they hear Teresa call
Defendant names or threaten him. R.279:82, 117, 127.
They did, however, hear Defendant threaten to kill Teresa “multiple
times.” R.279:82, 86, 117; R.278:150. He promised Teresa that “‘one of these
days I’m going to kill you.’” R.279:82, 86, 117; R.278:150. And he almost made
good on that promise before he shot her. With Jack and John in the backseat,
Defendant tried to run Teresa over with their SUV, but Teresa was able to
jump out of the way. R.279:88, 115.
During most every argument, Defendant told Teresa that “she was
worthless.” R.279:116, 127. He berated her for “putting out no effort to . . . go
get a job.” R.278:94. And he would “cuss” at her “a lot,” calling her names
like “bitch” or “just anything to put her down, that could hurt her and make
her feel like she was a bad person.” R.279:82, 86, 117; R.278:150. He even
taunted Teresa that she “like[s] to do it with [her] relatives” because she had
been sexually abused as a child. R.279:50-51. And he used the contact name
“Bitch Teresa” for her in his cell phone. R.278:150; State’s Ex.29 (Defendant’s
cell phone records).
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Teresa called the police for help a few times. R.278:88; R.279:91. One
time, Defendant’s “best” friend since childhood, Officer Howell, responded.
R.278:3-4, 13. But he just took Defendant on a ride so that Defendant could
“cool off.” 278:17, 27.
After one call to the police though, Defendant was arrested, and he
pleaded guilty to domestic violence assault. R.278:88-89, 152. Afterwards,
Teresa obtained a protective order and they separated temporarily. R.278:8990, 157. But they soon got back together. R.278:90, 158.
In the months before Teresa’s death, one neighbor, Dorothy, believed
that “something was very wrong.” R.279:34. When she visited Teresa at
home, Teresa was “never” comfortable, but “was always nervous” and
“always . . . looking around.” R.279:30-31. One time when Dorothy came
over, Teresa was “crying and shaking” and “distraught.” R.279:34-35.
Dorothy also witnessed Defendant harangue Teresa for not getting a job for
which she had applied. R.279:36. And another time, when Dorothy dropped
Teresa home, Defendant “came charging out of the house and threw [the car]
door open.” R.279:34-35. He yelled, “‘What do you think you’re doing?’” and
ordered Teresa to “‘[g]et in the house.’” Id.
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After that, it became “extremely hard” for Dorothy to “get ahold” of
Teresa. R.279:32. Whenever Dorothy called or came over to the house,
Defendant would tell her that Teresa was sick or sleeping. R.279:32-33.
The murder
On the day that Defendant killed Teresa, Teresa’s mother, Marsha,
talked to Teresa on the phone for about 40 minutes. R.279:52, 56. Towards the
end of the conversation, Marsha heard Defendant pick up the other handset
to listen in. R.279:53. Teresa was telling her mother that Defendant had “been
driving reckless again” and that she was “disappointed.” R.279:56, 62.
Marsha heard Defendant exclaim, “My wife and my mother-in-law are
saying bad things about me.” R.279:53-54, 57. Seventeen minutes later,
Defendant called 911. State’s Ex.29. Teresa was dead.
When officers responded, Defendant complied with their orders and
showed no emotion. R.277:42, 62, 69, 72, 91; R.278:10. He answered their
questions about where Teresa was, where his gun was, and explained that his
sons were at friends’ houses. R.277:43, 49, 70, 90-91. When Defendant’s
friend Officer Howell arrived later, however, Defendant became upset and
cried. R.277:82, 92-93; R.278:9, 20. Defendant told Officer Howell that he
“‘thought it would be worth it, but it’s not.’” R.278:30.
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B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged with domestic violence murder. See R.3-2.
The defense
Defendant did not contest that he killed Teresa. R.277:19; R.278:161;

R.280:48. Rather, he argued that the jury should convict him of the reduced
charge of manslaughter because he had acted under extreme emotional
distress. R.277:19, 27. He claimed that he “just [got] to the end of his rope”
and shot Teresa in a fit of fear and rage. Id. Defense counsel declared in his
opening statement that “it’s more serious for somebody to think about, plan
out, coldly and calmly kill somebody. And it is less serious if somebody does
it under what is called extreme emotional distress.” Id. Defense counsel told
the jury that he would present evidence that Defendant and Teresa fought
constantly and that in the weeks before the shooting, their fighting
“escalated.” R.277:24. It had gotten so bad, defense counsel stated, that the
day before the shooting, Defendant called his mother and said, “‘Mom I’m
afraid. The gun safe is open and a gun is missing. And I think Teresa is going
to kill me.’” R.277:25. Then, when he heard Teresa talking to her mother on
the phone the next day, “hamm[ing] it up” and trying to “twist the screws
and antagonize him,” defense counsel claimed, Defendant snapped and shot
her. R.277:27.
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In support of the theory that he laid out in his opening statement,
defense counsel called Defendant’s mother, his two brothers, and three coworkers to testify. R.278:171, 192, 201, 213-214, 224, 234. Defendant testified
as well. R.278:82-170. They all painted Teresa as a nag who pushed
Defendant’s buttons and would not let things go. For example, Defendant’s
childhood friend Officer Howell testified that Defendant told him that Teresa
“would just kind of nitpick and push and just not let stuff go.” R.278:19, 28.
Defendant’s mother also testified that Defendant and Teresa had a
“love/hate relationship” where “they really loved each other but they
couldn’t get along.” R.278:172. They fought “over money” because Teresa
would buy things that they could not afford. R.278:189. And before the
shooting, their fighting was “bad.” R.278:176, 186.
Defendant’s brothers testified that Defendant and Teresa “would fight
a lot and argue” about money. R.278:193, 196. One of the brothers said that
he once saw Teresa yell at Defendant, but Defendant just ignored her.
R.278:204-205. The other brother testified that about three days before the
shooting, he talked to Defendant on the phone and although Defendant
“didn’t confide” in him, Defendant seemed “really distraught.” R.278:196.
Defendant’s coworkers also testified that they had heard Defendant
fighting with Teresa on the phone while he was at work. R.278:216, 225, 235.
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They said that Teresa would call every so often, but she called “multiple times
weekly” in the month before the shooting. R.278:220, 226-227. One time, a
coworker noticed that when Defendant hung up on Teresa while she was
yelling, she called back, and then came to the shop. R.278:236. Another
coworker testified that the night before the shooting, Defendant called to ask
if he could come and stay with him. R.278:218-219. The coworker agreed,
observing that Defendant seemed “upset.” R.278:219.
Defense counsel elicited on cross-examination of the responding
officers that although Defendant was calm and collected when they first
arrived, at some point after he was handcuffed and arrested, he became “very
emotional and distraught.” R.277:61-62, 64, 93; R.278:20-21.
Defendant also testified. R.278:82-170. He said that in the two weeks
before the shooting, he and Teresa argued constantly. R.278:103. According
to him, the fights were worse than they had ever been, the “get in your face,
yell, scream at each other, spit flying” kind of fighting. R.278:107, 159-160.
He said that they fought because Teresa was angry at Defendant for many
reasons: he bought the boys and himself guns with their tax return money,
R.278:94; Defendant was restoring a car with Jack, but Teresa thought it cost
too much money, R.278:97-98; Defendant wanted to take the boys camping
but Teresa said they did not have enough money to go, R.278:105; Defendant
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drove Teresa’s car to work, R.278:106; and when Defendant drove the SUV
instead, it used too much gas, R.278:107.
Defendant testified that on Friday, the day before the shooting,
Teresa’s mother called and he took the phone to Teresa in the bedroom.
R.278:110. He said that when he walked in, he saw Teresa sitting on a stool
“in front of the bed crouched down.” R.278:111. The gun safe had been
pulled out from under the dresser, it was open, and “there was only one pistol
sitting there.” R.278:112. Normally, both his gun and Teresa’s silver Beretta
were in the safe. R.278:116, 161, 167-168. But now, the Beretta was gone. Id.
“Having seen that the gun was missing,” Defendant testified that he was
“scared to death” and “worried that Teresa was going to use that gun to do
some harm” to him. R.278:117. Defendant worried especially because
“Wednesday there was a threat made. And so when [he] came in and seen
that, [he] thought the threat was serious.” R.278:113. Defendant said that he
left the bedroom and called his mother to tell her what he had seen. R.278:118.
But after the kids came home, he “felt a little more comfortable,” and that
they “kind of just floated through the night.” R.278:120. He took Ambien and
went to sleep with Teresa that night. R.278:121.
Defendant testified that the next day, Saturday, he was “still feeling
scared.” R.278:121. He helped a neighbor with his car, went to a haircut
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appointment, and went to his work to put some new tires on Teresa’s car.
R.278:121. Afterward, he “really didn’t want to go home” so he called a coworker and asked if he could stay at his house for the night. R.278:122, 166.
His co-worker agreed, but Defendant went home instead. R.278:123. There,
Defendant testified, he moved some vehicles and cleaned up an oil spill,
fighting with Teresa the “whole time.” R.278:125. He said that Teresa was
upset that he “kept rubbing the fence” when he moved the vehicles, that he
had spilled oil on the driveway, and that he had gotten the wrong sized tires
for her car. R.278:108-109, 124-125.
When Defendant went inside to use the master bathroom, he saw that
the gun safe “was pulled out again from underneath . . . the dresser” and it
was “open with one pistol in it.” R.278:126-127. Teresa’s silver Beretta was
missing again. R.278:163.
Defendant testified that he left the house and “went to the bathroom in
a ditch out back in the corner” because he “didn’t dare go back in the house.”
R.278:127. He stayed in the garage. R.278:128. But “the house door to the
garage would come open” and “Teresa would be leaning out the door and
just staring at [him] and so [he] just was kind of freaking out.” R.278:128-129.
Although he did not see it, he believed Teresa had the gun with her.
R.278:129. Defendant said he “was scared to death.” Id. He was “starting to
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wig out, just freak out.” Id. After a while, Defendant “finally” decided that
he was going to “go in there and confront this.” Id. When he went inside, he
could hear Teresa on the phone talking with her mother. R.278:130. He went
to the kitchen and got a drink. R.278:131. Teresa then “yelled . . . something”
to him and he “snapped.” Id. Defendant went “storming in there.” Id. He
saw that Teresa was pointing her cell phone at him. Id. He “reached down
and grabbed the gun” from the open gun safe, “cocked it on the way up,” and
shot Teresa. Id. He then walked over to Teresa and saw that the Beretta was
on the floor on the other side of the bed. R.278:132. He picked it up and put it
on the bed. Id.
Defense counsel finally elicited from the forensic investigator that the
Beretta was loaded and that investigators had been unable to obtain
comparable fingerprints from it. R.277:160-161, 165-167.
The prosecutor’s hearsay objection to
Defendant’s testimony about Teresa’s alleged threat
and defense counsel’s response
During Defendant’s testimony, the prosecutor made six hearsay
objections. R.278:98, 106, 110, 113-116, 118-119. The trial court sustained each
one. Id. When Defendant testified that “Wednesday there was a threat
made” and so when he saw that the gun safe was open, he “thought the threat
was serious”; the prosecutor did not object. R.278:113. But the prosecutor
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objected when Defendant began to answer defense counsel’s question about
who made the threat. R.278:113, 114. The trial court asked counsel to
approach and instructed defense counsel that “[t]here’s no way that you’re
going to dance around and get a threat [in] without [it] being hearsay.”
R.291:113. Defense counsel did not offer any counterargument. Id.
After the sidebar, defense counsel asked Defendant what he was
thinking when he saw the gun safe open. R.278:113-114. Defendant began to
answer that he “was thinking that the threat that I had received the day
before” when the prosecutor asked to approach. Id. The trial court excused
the jury, then warned defense counsel to stay away from that line of inquiry
because “the only responses [it was] getting are clearly hearsay.” R.278:115116. Defense counsel did not argue that the threat was not hearsay at either
sidebar. R.278:113-115.
When defense counsel resumed questioning Defendant after the jury
returned, he did not ask Defendant about the threat but guided him to talk
about seeing the gun missing from the safe and feeling “scared to death”
because he “worried that Teresa was going to use that gun to do some harm”
to him. R.278:117. The specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat are not in the
record.
Closing arguments
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In closing, defense counsel assured the jury that he was not asking
them “to say that . . .what [Defendant] did was right,” but to find that
Defendant acted under extreme emotional distress. R.280:43, 54, 57. He
argued that if Defendant “was under extreme emotion,” the law provided
that “what he did was not as serious as somebody who does it in cold blood.”
Id.
Defense counsel argued that Defendant suffered from extreme
emotional distress because his “reason” had been “overborne by intense
feelings” of “passion, anger, distress, grief, [and] excessive agitation.”
R.280:48-49 (quoting jury instr. 12). He explained that Defendant’s intense
feelings arose from “years of fighting” coupled with an escalation of fighting
in the two weeks before the shooting and “a gun out of the safe.” R.280:50-52.
He pointed to the loaded Beretta that was sitting on the bed. R.280:52-53.
Defense counsel further argued that Defendant was not substantially
at fault for his extreme emotions. R.280:58. Rather, Teresa was. Id. He
contended that in the two-week period before the shooting, Defendant did
not call Teresa names, nor was he “violent with her.” Id. He argued that
Teresa, however, started all the fights in this period because she was angry at
Defendant for doing things like spilling oil in the driveway and using her car.
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Id. Teresa also took the gun out of the safe and leered at him several times
while he was out in the garage. Id. R.280:57-59.
The prosecutor dismissed Defendant’s extreme emotional distress
defense. R.280:33. The prosecutor first argued that Teresa and Defendant’s
history of fighting did not create an unusual and overwhelming stress for
Defendant because fighting was their norm and Defendant substantially
contributed to it. R.280:35-38. As for the gun, the prosecutor argued that
Defendant’s story about Teresa taking it out of the safe was not credible.
R.280:38-39. Most importantly, the prosecutor said, Defendant never
mentioned a gun when he called 911. Id. Instead, Defendant calmly and
collectedly told the dispatcher that he killed his wife because she had been
complaining about him to her mother and she tried to take his picture. Id.
Defendant’s story was also not credible, the prosecutor stated, because when
Defendant shot Teresa, she “was no threat.” R.280:40. The prosecutor pointed
out that she “was sitting on the bed, semi-reclined, feet crossed, crocheting.”
Id. “She wasn’t pointing a gun at him,” and she “didn’t provoke him.” Id. But
even if the jury were to believe Defendant’s story about the gun, the
prosecutor argued, Defendant still failed to establish the defense because it
was not “reasonable” to believe that “Teresa was preparing to kill him”
where he “didn’t see a gun” and did not know where it was. R.280:41.
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Jury deliberations and verdict
Sometime after being excused to deliberate, the jury sent a note to the
trial court asking what “the legal definition of ‘substantially caused’” was.
R.181; R.280:72. The jury had been instructed that the special mitigation of
extreme emotional distress did not apply if Defendant’s distress was
“substantially caused by [his] own conduct.” R.199 (jury instr. 13).
Later, the jury sent a note to the trial court stating that it was “at an
absolute impasse six to two.” R.280:78; R.182. The jury explained that “two
feel that ‘substantially caused’ needs to be ‘the majority of the time.’” R.182;
R.280:78. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court gave the jury a
supplemental instruction, asking it to continue its deliberations “in an effort
to agree upon a verdict.” R.280:94-95; R.180. After two more hours and
thirteen minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict, finding
Defendant guilty of murder. R.280:95-96; R.179, 174.
Defendant timely appealed and this Court transferred the case to the
court of appeals. R.238, 243.
The court of appeals’ decision
Defendant argued on appeal that his counsel was ineffective because
when the prosecutor objected that Teresa’s alleged threat was hearsay, he did
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not argue that it was actually admissible nonhearsay.2 State v. Scott, 2017 UT
App 74, ¶¶17, 19, 397 P.3d 837. He also moved under rule 23B, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, for a remand so that he could introduce the words of
Teresa’s alleged threat into the record. See appellate docket.
Without granting Defendant’s rule 23B motion, the court of appeals
agreed that defense counsel was ineffective. It held that defense counsel
performed deficiently because he failed “to correctly use the rules of evidence
to support [Defendant]’s defense” and argue that the alleged threat was not
hearsay. Id. at ¶25. According to the court of appeals, a reasonable attorney
would have made such an argument because Teresa’s threat was admissible
under the rules of evidence and it was “central” to Defendant’s defense
strategy “to show that his distress originated outside his own behavior.” Id.
at ¶¶25, 28.
The State had argued that a reasonable attorney may have chosen not
to pursue admitting the precise words of the threat because omitting the
specific words of the threat may have allowed the jury to magnify the threat
beyond its actual words. The court of appeals rejected that argument. Id. at

Defendant also argued that the trial court erred by giving a verdicturging instruction. Scott, 2017 UT App, ¶17. Because the court of appeals held
that trial counsel was ineffective, it did not address this issue. Id.
2
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¶27. It believed that “the negative repercussions of omitting the content of
the threat were greater than the possible benefits” where “admitting its
content would have only strengthened [Defendant]’s defense.” Id. (emphasis
added). It came to this conclusion even though the precise words of the threat
were not in the record. Id. at ¶13 n.2.
The court of appeals also held that keeping the precise words of the
threat from the jury prejudiced Defendant because “the jury was at an
impasse over whether [Defendant] had substantially caused the distress he
felt” and testimony of the specific threat and its “effect” on Defendant could
have caused the jury to remain deadlocked. Id. at ¶34. Again, it came to this
conclusion without the specific wording of the threat being in the record. Id.
at ¶13 n.2. And of course, the jury did hear Defendant testify about how the
threat affected him. R.278:113, 117-118.
Judge Voros and Judge Christiansen wrote separate concurring
opinions that urged the legislature to consider amending the extreme
emotional distress defense statute so that an abusive intimate partner cannot
claim special mitigation. Id. at ¶¶36-46. And although Judge Christiansen
concluded that Defendant did not qualify for the special mitigation here and
that she did “not believe that hearing the specifics of the alleged threat would
ultimately have made a difference in the jury’s verdict,” she agreed that
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remand was “warranted” because “it is ‘not within the province of an
appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of a front line fact-finder.’”
Id. at ¶¶43, 45 (Christiansen, J., concurring).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Deficient Performance. The court of appeals applied an
incorrect deficient performance standard, and in doing so, incorrectly held
that defense counsel performed deficiently. First, the court of appeals never
assessed whether defense

counsel’s

representation

was

objectively

reasonable as Strickland requires. Instead, the court of appeals began and
ended its deficient performance analysis with assessing whether counsel had
a sound trial strategy. Whether defense counsel’s action was a sound strategy
may be one consideration. But it is not alone determinative of objectively
reasonable representation. Rather, Defendant had to prove that counsel’s
actual course of action—proceeding on the uncontested testimony that Teresa
had threatened him and the threat made him fear for his life—fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. The court of appeals erred because it
never determined whether Defendant met that burden. And because defense
counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable here, the court of appeals
was incorrect when it held that defense counsel performed deficiently.
Second, the court of appeals erred when it held that defense counsel
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was deficient for not trying to introduce the words of Teresa’s alleged threat
when the evidence was admissible and “would have only strengthened his
case.” As stated, Strickland requires only that defense counsel perform
objectively reasonably. It does not require counsel to take every action that is
arguably beneficial to the defense. The court of appeals erred because it never
determined whether Defendant met that burden.
Finally, the record did not support the court of appeals’ conclusion that
defense counsel performed deficiently. Because the actual content of Teresa’s
alleged threat is not part of the record, the court of appeals had no evidentiary
basis to support its conclusion that the “content” of the threat would only
strengthen the defense, rather than harm it. This was also error.
Point II: Prejudice. The court of appeals also erroneously applied
Strickland’s prejudice standard. First, because the actual content of Teresa’s
alleged threat is not part of the record, the court of appeals impermissibly
speculated that the content of Teresa’s alleged threat would have affected the
outcome of the proceeding had the jury heard it. For this reason alone, this
Court should reverse.
The court of appeals also erroneously held that Defendant had proved
Strickland prejudice because it did not consider how the jury hearing the
content of Teresa’s alleged threat would have so changed the entire
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evidentiary picture that not hearing it undermined confidence in the
outcome. Rather, the court of appeals considered evidence of Teresa’s threat
in isolation. Under the correct analysis, the jury hearing the content of
Teresa’s alleged threat would not have tipped the scales in Defendant’s favor
or otherwise changed the outcome of the proceeding. The totality of the
evidence showed that Defendant did not act under distress, but killed Teresa
because he felt Teresa disrespected and picked on him.

ARGUMENT
A defendant’s burden in proving that defense counsel was
constitutionally ineffective is well-established. First, the defendant must
prove that his counsel performed deficiently. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Second, he must prove that his counsel’s deficient
performance was prejudicial—that there is a reasonable likelihood that,
absent counsel’s deficient performance, the result at trial would have been
different. Id. A failure to establish either Strickland element is fatal to an
ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. Moreover, it is “not
enough” for a defendant to show that “counsels’ performance could have
been better or that counsels’ performance might have contributed to his
conviction.” State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258–59 (Utah 1993). Rather, he must
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show “actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice.” Id. at 1259
(emphasis in original).
“Strickland’s standard, although by no means insurmountable, is
highly demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). And
surmounting it “is never an easy task.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122
(2011) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 346, 371 (2010)). The court of
appeals incorrectly applied Strickland’s standard to hold that Defendant
surmounted it here.
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED AN INCORRECT
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE STANDARD THEREBY
INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL
PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY
Strickland

required

Defendant

to

prove

that

trial

counsel’s

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. And “counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance.” Id. at 690. To meet his burden, Defendant
had to prove that “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as his
attorney did. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124. This high standard has its roots in the
recognition that there “are countless ways to provide effective assistance in
any given case,” and that “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would
not defend a particular client in the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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The court of appeals failed to hold Defendant to this standard, and by
that failure disregarded its underlying premise—that there were “countless
ways” for Defendant’s counsel to “provide [him] effective assistance.” Id.
Instead, it identified only one of many courses available to counsel and found
him deficient because he did not follow it.
The court of appeals concluded that defense counsel was deficient
because he did not have a “sound” strategic reason for his action. Scott, 2017
UT App 74, ¶27. But the determinative question under Strickland is not
whether counsel’s action was strategic, or even sound, but whether counsel’s
performance was objectively unreasonable. Because the court of appeals
failed to conduct this analysis—as Strickland requires—and thereby
incorrectly concluded that counsel was deficient, it erred.
Similarly, merely identifying a course of action that may have
benefitted the defense is not the correct inquiry. So even if counsel could
have successfully introduced the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat,
and even if that evidence arguably would have supported Defendant’s
defense, that did not prove deficient performance under Strickland. Rather,
as stated, Defendant had to prove that counsel’s actual course of action—
proceeding on the uncontested testimony that Teresa had threatened him and
the threat made him fear for his life—fell below an objective standard of
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reasonableness. The court of appeals erred because it never determined
whether Defendant met that burden.
Finally, even the court of appeals’ assessment that counsel had a better
course of action—that the benefits of admitting the specific words of the
threat outweighed any detriment—was not supported by the record. The
court of appeals could have legitimately reached that conclusion only if the
specific words of the threat were in the record. They were not. This was also
error.
A. The court of appeals applied an incorrect deficient
performance standard because it never assessed whether
defense
counsel’s
representation
was
objectively
unreasonable.
The court of appeals began and ended its deficient performance
analysis with assessing whether counsel had a sound trial strategy. Because
it found that he did not, it found that he was deficient.
As explained later, even that finding was incorrect. But the analysis
itself was also incorrect.

Defendant had to prove that his counsel’s

performance was objectively reasonable—in other words, that “no competent
attorney” would have done as counsel did. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124. Whether
defense counsel’s action was a sound strategy may be one consideration. But
it is not alone determinative of objectively reasonable representation.
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To establish deficient performance under Strickland, a defendant must
show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance,” however, is “highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. And
“counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance.” Id. at
690.

To prove deficient performance, a defendant must rebut that

presumption.
Certainly, whether counsel had a considered strategy for a challenged
course can inform whether counsel’s representation was reasonable. Again,
there is a “strong presumption that under the circumstances the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy,” and a defendant must rebut
that presumption in order to succeed. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶19, 12
P.3d 92 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption
exists because of the “widely varying ‘circumstances faced by defense
counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how to best
represent a criminal defendant.” Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, ¶113, 388 P.3d 447
(quoting State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶70, 353 P.3d 55) (alteration in original
and citation omitted). “Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed
the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and
interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”
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Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). Reviewing courts thus are
“required not simply to ‘give [the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt,’ but to
affirmatively entertain the range of possible ‘reasons [defense] counsel may
have had for proceeding as they did.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196
(2011) (alterations in original and citation omitted).
And to rebut the presumption of sound strategy, a defendant must
“persuad[e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s
actions.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original;
quotations and citations omitted). The State is not required to articulate a
reasonable explanation for counsel’s acts or omissions. Nor does a defendant
succeed merely because this Court cannot conceive of a tactical explanation
for counsel’s performance.

Rather, “‘the defendant’” always bears the

burden to “‘overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Benvenuto v.
State, 2007 UT 53, ¶19, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see
also Burt v. Titlow 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (explaining that “burden to ‘show
that counsel’s performance was deficient’ rests squarely on the defendant”)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). And when it is possible to conceive of a
reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s actions, then a defendant clearly
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has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel performed
reasonably. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶7.
The Strickland presumption of a sound strategy thus can be dispositive,
but only of a finding of effective performance, not deficient performance. In
other words, when counsel’s actions appear designed to further a reasonable
trial strategy, then a defendant has necessarily failed to show objectively
unreasonable performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Clark, 2004 UT 25,
¶6 (explaining that defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that
“there was no conceivable tactical basis” for counsel’s actions) (emphasis in
original).
But the lack of a considered strategic basis for counsel’s performance
does not automatically render his performance objectively unreasonable. See
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036,
1048, 1050-1051 (10th Cir. 2002). Even when a considered strategic reason for
counsel’s performance seems elusive, a defendant still cannot carry his
burden of proving deficient performance unless he can show that his
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Thus, whether counsel’s course of action is part
of a considered strategy may be relevant, but it is not controlling.
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The ultimate question is whether counsel’s performance was
objectively reasonable. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481. “Even where an
attorney’s ignorance of relevant law and facts precludes a court from
characterizing certain actions as strategic (and therefore presumptively
reasonable),” “the pertinent question under the first prong of Strickland
remains whether, after considering all the circumstances of the case, the
attorney's representation was objectively unreasonable.” Bullock, 297 F.3d at
1050-1051.). The Sixth Amendment requires that counsel’s representation “be
only objectively reasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill.”
Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, counsel does not
necessarily perform deficiently even if he makes “minor mistakes” and
appears “momentarily confused” during trial. Id. at 487. Nor is counsel’s
action unreasonable simply because “another, possibly more reasonable or
effective strategy could have been employed.” State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶43,
328 P.3d 841, abrogated on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391
P.3d 1016. Counsel’s performance is deficient under Strickland only when “no
competent attorney” would have acted similarly. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124;
Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that counsel is deficient only when “counsel’s error is so
egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted
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similarly”); Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
even “if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel
did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is
shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done
so”).
Because counsel need not have a strategic reason for his every act, the
court of appeal’s analysis of counsel’s performance here misapprehended
Strickland’s deficient performance standard when it focused solely on
whether counsel proceeded under a sound strategy. The measure of deficient
performance is not, as the court of appeals held, whether defense counsel
could have made a successful nonhearsay argument. Nor is the measure
whether evidence of Teresa’s alleged threat would have benefited
Defendant’s defense. Rather, the question is whether this evidence was so
necessary, and the potential for conviction so great without it, that counsel’s
failure to make the nonhearsay argument was objectively unreasonable. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In other words, no competent attorney would have
failed to make that argument. Moore, 562 U.S. at 124; see also State v. Houston,
2015 UT 40, ¶76, 353 P.3d 55 (noting that when a defendant claims his counsel
was ineffective for not objecting to prosecutor’s closing argument, “the
question is ‘not whether the prosecutor’s comments were proper, but
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whether they were so improper that counsel’s only defensible choice was to
interrupt those comments with an objection’”) (quoting Bussard v. Lockhart,
32 F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1994).
The court of appeals never took this step. True, the court of appeals did
state that “counsel’s failure to correctly argue the rules of evidence fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶24. But it
never articulated how. And while it rejected the State’s proffered strategic
explanation for counsel’s action, the court did not—as Strickland requires—
explain why the specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat were so necessary,
and the potential for conviction so great without them, that no competent
attorney would have failed to make a nonhearsay argument in answer to the
prosecutor’s hearsay objection. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Moore, 562 U.S.
at 124; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481; Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1050-1051. Instead, it
simply rested on its determination that defense counsel’s strategy was
unsound. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶¶27-28. As shown, under Strickland, this is
insufficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
It is also incorrect. Defense counsel performed objectively reasonably
here.
The “inquiry into counsel’s performance should focus on ‘whether
counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.’”
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Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶76, 344 P.3d 581 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688); see also Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1050-1051 (“[T]he pertinent question under
the first prong of Strickland remains whether, after considering all the
circumstances of the case, the attorney’s representation was objectively
unreasonable.”).
Defense counsel faced difficult circumstances here. Defendant
admitted he shot and killed Teresa. R.280:62; State’s Ex.1. He explained to the
911 operator that he shot Teresa because she had been talking on “the phone
with her mother complaining about” Defendant, and that Teresa had been
“trying to take a picture” of him. R.280:63-64; State’s Ex.1. This confession
was recorded. State’s Ex.1. On the recording, Defendant calmly and
dispassionately describes killing his wife and the reasons why he did. Id. And
minutes before he shot Teresa, Teresa’s mother heard Defendant pick up the
other handset to listen in on their phone conversation and then exclaim, “My
wife and my mother-in-law are saying bad things about me.” R.279:53-54, 57.
When he was arrested, he told his officer friend that he “‘thought it would be
worth it, but [it was] not.’” R.277:95; R.278:30.
In addition, Defendant had a prior conviction for domestic violence
against Teresa. R.278:88-89, 152. He used the name “Bitch Teresa” for her in
his cell phone. R.278:150; State’s Ex.29. At least one neighbor had been
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concerned for Teresa’s wellbeing. R.279:34. And his two children had
witnessed him punch Teresa, emotionally denigrate her, and attempt to kill
her before. R.279:77, 82, 86, 90-91, 115-118, 127, 150.
And although Defendant claimed that Teresa threatened him, no one
else had ever heard her threaten Defendant or get “physical” with him as he
had with her. R.297:87, 91, 117, 127. Moreover, Teresa’s alleged threat was
made three days before Defendant shot her, but during that time Defendant
never told anyone, called the police, or went somewhere else to stay. Instead,
he took Ambien and slept by her side. R.278:113-129.
Defense counsel did well with what he had. Under these facts,
Defendant could not credibly claim self-defense. See Utah Code Annotated §
76-2-402(1)(b) (West 2017) (providing killing another is justified only when
deadly force is “necessary” to defend against “another person’s imminent use
of unlawful force”). But by raising the special mitigation defense of extreme
emotional distress, defense counsel could try to mitigate Defendant’s
confession in the 911 recording phone call as well as use Defendant’s
tumultuous relationship with Teresa to claim that he had been overcome by
emotion when he shot her. See Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(1)(b) (West
2017) (providing special mitigation when actor suffered “extreme emotional
distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse”).
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But contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, Teresa’s alleged threat
was not a big piece of this defense. Because Defendant’s 911 phone call
demonstrated that Defendant had killed Teresa in anger and frustration,
defense counsel could not rely alone on Defendant’s fear of Teresa harming
him. Defense counsel thus argued that Defendant was overcome by an array
of emotions—rage, stress, anger, frustration, and fear.
Moreover, Defendant testified that he felt threatened by Teresa in
many ways—the open safe, the missing gun, Teresa opening the garage door
and leering at him, and Teresa being angry with him and starting fights.
R.278:94, 97-98, 105-109, 112, 117, 124-129. Again, Teresa’s alleged verbal
threat was only a part of this defense.
And Defendant was allowed to testify that “there was a threat made.”
R.278:113. He continued that when he later saw Teresa in front of the gun safe
and that a Beretta was missing, he believed the threat was serious. Id. He told
the jury that this made him “scared to death,” and made him believe that
Teresa intended to harm him. R.278:117.
With all this in mind, when Defendant drew an objection as he began
to testify about what Teresa actually said when she allegedly threatened him,
defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that he need not respond
to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection by arguing that the words were
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nonhearsay. By that time, the trial court had already sustained several
hearsay objections made by the prosecutor. Defense counsel could have
reasonably concluded from the judge’s strong admonition against inquiring
into the specific words of the threat that he was not likely to succeed in getting
the words of the threat admitted. R.291:113. And where the jury had already
heard ample testimony that Defendant believed Teresa had threatened him,
he “thought the threat was serious,” and he believed Teresa intended to harm
him, defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that getting the
specific wording of Teresa’s threat was not so necessary to the defense that it
was worth pressing the issue further. R.278:113-114, 117. Indeed, a reasonable
attorney could conclude that he already had more than enough to add the
threat piece to the larger extreme emotional disturbance puzzle—Defendant
testified that he was afraid of Teresa because she had threatened him, he
believed she had a gun, and he believed she intended to use it.
And certainly, while the record is silent as to the precise words of
Teresa’s alleged threat, defense counsel knew what they were. Richter, 562
U.S. at 105 (“Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”). And knowing
what the specific words of the threat were, counsel could have reasonably
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concluded that introducing the precise words would not have been so
materially more helpful to Defendant’s defense that it was critical to get them
into evidence. By leaving the specific words to the jury’s imagination, counsel
could magnify the effect of Defendant’s testimony, allowing the jury to
believe that the threat was greater than what it actually may have been.
The court of appeals ignored the global analysis that Strickland
required and instead assigned determinative significance to a single event. It
therefore ignored Strickland’s directive to not “second-guess” defense
counsel’s performance on the basis of an inanimate record. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689. And it ignored the directive to presume that in the context of the entire
case, counsel’s representation was reasonable.
“The Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care.”
Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Because the court of appeals failed to do so here—
and incorrectly concluded that defense counsel performed deficiently in the
process—this Court should reverse.
B.

The court of appeals incorrectly construed Strickland to
require counsel to act when it will benefit the defense.
The court of appeals also erred when it held that defense counsel was

deficient for not trying to introduce the words of Teresa’s alleged threat
because, according to the court, this evidence was admissible and “would
have only strengthened his case.” Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶27. As shown
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above, Strickland requires only that defense counsel perform objectively
reasonably. It does not require counsel to take every action that is arguably
beneficial to the defense.
The court of appeals held that defense counsel was deficient here
because a reasonable attorney, in response to the prosecutor’s hearsay
objection, would have argued that Teresa’s threat was admissible
nonhearsay. Id. at ¶25. The reason why, according to the court of appeals, was
that Teresa’s threat was “central” to Defendant’s defense and “admitting its
content would have only strengthened” his case. Id. at ¶27. In other words,
the court of appeals concluded that because counsel could have made an
argument to overcome the prosecutor’s hearsay objection and doing so
would have only “strengthen[ed]” his case, the Sixth Amendment required
counsel to make that argument.
The court of appeals’ decision follows a pattern of Utah decisions
incorrectly finding that counsel’s representation is per se deficient when the
court concludes that counsel omitted an objection or argument that may have
advanced the defense. See State v. Lewis, 2014 UT App 241, ¶13, 337 P.3d 1053
(finding counsel deficient where there “was no conceivable tactical benefit” to
foregoing instruction); State v. Doutre, 2014 UT App 192, ¶24, 335 P.3d 366 (“If
clearly inadmissible evidence has no conceivable benefit to a defendant, the
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failure to object to it on nonfrivilous grounds cannot ordinarily be considered
a reasonable trial strategy.”); State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, ¶22, 169 P.3d 806
(finding counsel deficient where the court could “see no tactical advantage for
not objecting to the clearly erroneous jury instruction”); State v. Ott, 2010 UT
1, ¶38, 247 P.3d 344 (holding that if evidence has no “conceivable beneficial
value to defendant,” failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy).
But this is incorrect. Merely because counsel could have successfully
made an argument, and that doing so may have supported the defendant’s
defense, is never enough to prove deficient performance under Strickland.
Rather, the determinative inquiry is, as always, “whether a reasonable,
competent lawyer could have chosen the strategy that was employed in the
real-time context of trial.” State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶14, 355 P.3d 1031
(quotation marks omitted). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. at 481. Stated differently, a defendant must prove that no reasonable
attorney would have taken the same action that his counsel did. Moore, 562
U.S. at 124.
The United States Supreme Court thus “has never required defense
counsel to pursue every claim or defense,” nor has it required “counsel to
raise every nonfrivilous defense.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123,
127 (2009). In each case, counsel faces a “range of legitimate decisions
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regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.’” Met, 2016 UT 51, ¶113
(quoting Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶70) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
And within that range of possible decisions, each choice may be legitimate.
Id. As Strickland explained, “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective
assistance in any given case.” 466 U.S. at 689.
As a result, “no Supreme Court precedent establish[es] a ‘nothing to
lose’ standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.” Mirzayance, 556
U.S. at 122. Nor does it establish a “‘[n]o actual tactical advantage was to be
gained’” standard. Id. at 122 n.3. Rather, the analysis is the same: whether the
action counsel actually took was objectively reasonable.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ holding, then, merely because counsel
here did not present an argument that may have been successful is not
dispositive. Defense counsel is permitted to choose a strategy within the wide
“range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant.’” Met, 2016 UT 51, ¶113. And as long as his choice is reasonable,
defense counsel performed effectively, regardless of the merits of the other
possible choices.
As shown in Point I.A. above, defense counsel performed objectively
reasonably here. Merely because he could have made another choice—to
argue that the words of Teresa’s alleged threat were not hearsay—does not
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change this conclusion. The court of appeals erroneously held that it did. See
Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶43 (explaining that counsel’s actions are not
unreasonable simply because “another, possibly more reasonable or effective
strategy could have been employed”); Rogers, 13 F.3d at 386 (holding that
even “if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel
did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is
shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done
so”). This Court should reverse for this reason as well.
C. Because the actual content of the threat was not part of the
record, the court of appeals had no evidentiary basis to support
its conclusion that the “content” of the threat would only
strengthen the defense, rather than harm it.
Finally, the record did not support the finding on which the court of
appeals based its deficient performance holding. The court of appeals held
that “the negative repercussions of omitting the content of the threat were
greater than the possible benefits; admitting its content would only have
strengthened [Defendant]’s defense.” Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶27. Likewise,
it stated that a “serious threat to [Defendant] from Teresa would have been an
important piece of evidence at trial.” Id. at ¶25 (emphasis added).
But the precise words of the threat are not part of the record. Id. at ¶13
n.2 (explaining that Defendant’s “testimony did not include the actual words
of the threat” and the “threat’s content is not included in the record on
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appeal”).3 The court of appeals thus did not know if the threat was “serious.”
Id. at ¶25. Nor could it determine whether “the negative repercussions of
omitting the content of the threat were greater than the possible benefits” or
if “admitting its content would only have strengthened [Defendant]’s
defense.” Id. at ¶27.
Without knowing the content of the threat, concluding that it
necessarily would have strengthened the defense was mere speculation.
However, “proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative
matter but must be a demonstrable reality.” State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30,
253 P.3d 1082 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). And where
“the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel
performed effectively.” Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶17. By determining that the
unknown contents of Teresa’s alleged threat would have only strengthened
Defendant’s defense, the court of appeals turned this presumption on its
head. But “[i]t should go without saying that the absence of evidence cannot
overcome the “‘strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the

Defendant filed a motion under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to introduce evidence of the content of Teresa’s alleged threat into
the record on appeal. See appellate docket. The court of appeals did not grant,
or deny, that motion.
3
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wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 17
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
As it was, the jury heard Defendant testify that Teresa threatened him
and that the threat caused him to fear for his life. R.278:113, 117. But without
knowing the precise words of this alleged threat, it would be just as likely
that they would have led the jury to conclude that Defendant’s fear was
unfounded rather than to conclude the opposite. Indeed, the court of appeals
conceded as much. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶27. But if the first is true, then
counsel chose wisely by not pressing the issue. And without knowing what
those words were, there is no basis for concluding that they would have made
the defense stronger, let alone so materially stronger that no competent
attorney would have let the trial proceed without arguing that they were
admissible nonhearsay. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30; Titlow, 134 S. Ct. at 17.
The court of appeals thus erred. This Court should reverse for this
reason as well.
****
For all of the reasons argued, the court of appeals incorrectly held that
Defendant’s counsel was deficient when he did not attempt to overcome the
hearsay objection to the precise words of the threat and relied instead on
Defendant’s uncontested testimony that Teresa had threatened him and the
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threat frightened him, in order to support the “threat” component of his
larger extreme emotional disturbance theory.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED
STRICKLAND’S PREJUDICE STANDARD
The court of appeals also erroneously concluded that Defendant was
prejudiced when defense counsel did not get the precise words of Teresa’s
threat admitted. The court of appeals concluded that there was a reasonable
probability that the jury would have remained deadlocked had it heard
“more evidence” on what it deemed to be the “central,” disputed point. Scott,
2017 UT App 74, ¶¶28, 33. Because Defendant “was not allowed to offer any
other information regarding the threat, including the surrounding
circumstances, the words used, and the effect it had on him,” and his defense
counsel did not address the threat again, the court of appeals held that the
jury could have been “influenced” to remain deadlocked had it heard the
specific words of Teresa’s alleged threat. Id. at ¶¶33-34. This was especially
so, the court of appeals believed, because the prosecutor asserted in closing
that “Teresa was no threat” and that Defendant had no reasonable basis for
believing that she was a threat. Id. at ¶33.
This analysis falls short of what Strickland requires. To prove prejudice
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant “must show that

-45-

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694. A “[r]easonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. But “‘[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is
never an easy task.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (citation omitted).

The

“likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable,”
Richter, 562 U.S. at 112, such that counsel’s error “‘actually had an adverse
effect on the defense.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 693). In addition, the defendant’s proof of prejudice
“cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.”
Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30 (quotations and citation omitted). That is, he “has
the difficult burden of showing . . . actual prejudice.” Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259
(emphasis in original).
In assessing whether a defendant has carried his burden, appellate
courts “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This “requires . . . a probing and fact-specific
analysis.” Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 955 (2010) (per curiam). And the
appellate court must take into account that some of the facts underpinning
the defendant’s convictions will be completely unaffected by counsel’s
alleged errors, while those that are affected may be affected in trivial ways.
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Id. at 695-96. Errors that have an “isolated” or “trivial effect” on the verdict
are not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. Thus, at a minimum, the
reviewing must consider each of counsel’s alleged deficiencies in the context
of the inculpatory evidence presented at trial and demonstrate how counsel’s
alleged deficiency would have so altered the evidentiary landscape that a
more favorable outcome would be reasonably probable. Id.
The court of appeals failed to apply this standard. First, without
knowing the content of Teresa’s alleged threat, the court of appeals
impermissibly speculated that the content of the threat was both serious and
would have affected the outcome of the proceeding. Second, the court of
appeals did not evaluate the totality of the evidence before the jury, but
instead considered evidence of Teresa’s alleged threat in isolation.
A. The court of appeals impermissibly speculated that the content
of Teresa’s alleged threat would have affected the outcome of
the proceeding had the jury heard it.
As stated, the content of Teresa’s alleged threat is not in the record on
appeal. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶13 n.2. But as discussed above, the court of
appeals, without knowing the content of the threat, concluded that the
outcome of the trial would have been different if the jury had heard the
content of the threat. Without having the content of the threat in the record,
however, that conclusion was mere speculation.
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Speculation is not enough. The Strickland standard requires “actual
prejudice.” Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259 (emphasis in original). And “proof of
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a
demonstrable reality.” Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30.
Because the precise words of Teresa’s alleged threat are not in the
record, there was no basis to conclude that hearing them would have so
changed the total evidentiary picture that omitting them undermines
confidence in the outcome. Indeed, without have those words in the record,
there is no basis to reject the possibility that they were just as likely to cause
the jury to conclude that Defendant’s fear was unfounded.
The record was thus legally insufficient to support the court of appeals’
finding that Defendant had proved prejudice. Its prejudice holding fails for
this reason alone.

And because prejudice is a necessary element of an

ineffective assistance claim, the entire claim fails for this reason alone.
B.

The court of appeals erroneously held that Defendant had
proved Strickland prejudice because it did not consider how
the jury hearing the content of Teresa’s alleged threat would
have so changed the entire evidentiary picture that not hearing
it undermined confidence in the outcome.
The court of appeals also did not consider “the totality of the evidence”

before the jury, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, in “a probing, fact-specific
analysis,” Sears, 561 U.S. at 955. Rather, the court of appeals considered
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Teresa’s alleged threat in isolation of other evidence presented at trial and in
doing so, incorrectly magnified the importance of this small piece of
evidence.
But when considered under the correct standard—in light of all the
evidence presented at trial—there is no likelihood of a different outcome
here. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111. To prove special mitigation of extreme emotional
distress, Defendant must have proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that he acted “under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5205.5(1)(b) (West Supp. 2012). This means he must have been “‘exposed to
extremely unusual and overwhelming stress’ that would cause the average
reasonable person under the same circumstances to ‘experience a loss of selfcontrol’ and ‘be overborne by intense feelings, such as passion, anger,
distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions.’” State v. White,
2011 UT 21, ¶26, 251 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Utah
1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)).
But, the emotional distress cannot be “substantially caused by the
Defendant’s own conduct.” Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(3)(b). And “a
reasonable person facing the same situation would have reacted in a similar
way.” White, 2011 UT 21, ¶37.
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Defendant could not prove that he acted under extreme emotional
distress. His theory was simply unbelievable. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence showed that Defendant did not act under distress, let alone distress
that was “extreme[]” or “unusual.” Id. at ¶26. Nor would a reasonable person
have reacted in the same way Defendant did here. Id. The evidence, instead,
proved that Defendant killed Teresa because he felt she disrespected and
picked on him.
The jury heard the 911 call where Defendant calmly and
dispassionately explained to the dispatcher that he killed Teresa because she
had been talking on “the phone with her mother complaining about”
Defendant, and that Teresa had been “trying to take a picture” of him.
R.280:63-64; State’s Ex.1. This explanation was corroborated by Teresa’s
mother’s testimony that she heard Defendant pick up another handset to
listen in on their phone conversation and then exclaim, “My wife and my
mother-in-law are saying bad things about me.” R.279:53-54, 57. And the fact
that within seventeen minutes Teresa was dead, further validated that this
was the actual trigger for the murder. State’s Ex. 29 & 30.
When he was arrested, Defendant told his friend Officer Howell that
he “‘thought it would be worth it, but [it was] not.’” R.277:95; R.278:30. This
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statement shows deliberation and purposefulness, not a sudden loss of selfcontrol. See Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-205.5(1)(b).
In addition, Defendant’s prior violence and threatening behavior
toward Teresa undercut his defense that this was an out-of-character,
extreme, overwrought response to a triggering event.

See Utah Code

Annotated § 76-5-205.5(1)(b); White, 2011 UT 21, ¶26. Indeed, Defendant’s
violence against Teresa was routine. Defendant had a prior conviction for
domestic violence against Teresa. R.278:88-89, 152. At least one neighbor had
been concerned for Teresa’s wellbeing after seeing how Defendant treated
her. R.279:34. And his two children had witnessed him punch Teresa,
emotionally denigrate her, and attempt to kill her before. R.279:77, 82, 86, 9091, 115-118, 127, 150.
And although Defendant claimed that Teresa threatened him, no one
else had ever heard her threaten Defendant or get “physical” with him as he
had with her. R.297:87, 91, 117, 127. Moreover, Teresa’s alleged threat was
made three days before Defendant shot her, and during that time Defendant
never told anyone, called the police, or went somewhere else to stay. Instead,
he took Ambien and slept by her side. R.278:113-129.
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Indeed, Defendant’s mitigation defense was presented for the first time
at trial. In his 911 call and his statements to friends and police, he never
mentioned any threat, his fear of Teresa, or any missing gun.
And Teresa was no threat. When he shot her, Teresa was sitting on her
bed, crocheting. R.277:131. Even Defendant admitted that he never saw her
with a gun; he knew she was only holding a cell phone. State’s Ex. 1;
R.278:164, 169-170. The evidence against Defendant was overwhelming.
Hearing the specifics of Teresa’s alleged threat would not have changed this
evidentiary picture or the outcome. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111.
Contrary to the court of appeals’ opinion, Teresa’s alleged threat was
not a “central” piece of Defendant’s defense. Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶28. The
specific words of the threat even less so. Defendant’s defense was not selfdefense or that he was acting solely in fear. Rather, his defense was that he
was overcome by an array of emotions—rage, stress, anger, frustration, and
fear. His fear of Teresa was thus just one part of that array.
True, Defendant did endeavor to portray Teresa as the cause of his
distress and emotions, but again, the evidence he relied on was not just that
Teresa threatened him. The defense also presented—and focused on—
evidence that Teresa nitpicked Defendant, would not let issues go, was
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continually angry with him, and started all the fights in the two-week period
before Defendant shot her. R.280:57-59.
And the jury did hear that Defendant believed Teresa had threatened
him. It heard Defendant’s entire mitigation defense on this point: Teresa had
threatened him, he believed she had a gun, and he was afraid that she was
going to use the gun to harm him. R.278:110-118. Defendant testified that
combined with the couple’s history of fighting and Teresa continuing to
threaten him by “leaning out the door and just staring” at him, Defendant
“just freak[ed] out.” R.278:128-129. Adding the specifics of Teresa’s alleged
threat was thus unlikely to have added enough to overcome all the other
evidence undercutting the extreme emotional disturbance theory. Richter, 562
U.S. at 111. And even the specifics would have required the jury to believe
Defendant’s uncorroborated testimony weighed against third-party witness
accounts and Defendant’s recorded 911 call coldly reporting that he had
killed his wife for reasons wholly unrelated to any threat.
The court of appeals focused on the prosecutor’s closing argument that
Teresa was not a threat and that defense counsel did not mention the threat
again during the trial to find prejudice. But the prosecutor argued that Teresa
was not a threat when Defendant shot her: she was sitting on her bed,
crocheting, and Defendant did not see her holding the gun. That was
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undisputed and knowing the precise words of the threat made three days
earlier was irrelevant to that argument. And the fact that defense counsel did
not further highlight Teresa’s alleged threat only further emphasizes how
unimportant the threat was to the overall defense theory.
Moreover, merely because that the jury was at an impasse for any
period demonstrates not that defense counsel was ineffective, or that
Defendant was prejudiced, but how well defense counsel performed here.
Defense counsel was able to misdirect the jury’s focus to whether Defendant
or Teresa was substantially more responsible for their tumultuous
relationship. But the question whether Defendant or Teresa caused most of
their fights was irrelevant. Rather, to prove special mitigation, Defendant had
to show that “a reasonable person facing the same situation would have
reacted in a similar way” and that the emotional distress he felt was not
“substantially caused by the Defendant’s own conduct.” Utah Code
Annotated § 76-5-205.5(3)(b). The hen-pecked husband defense does not meet
this standard.
In sum, the court of appeals did not analyze or explain how the specific
words of Teresa’s alleged threat would have so changed the entire
evidentiary picture that not hearing them undermines confidence in the
verdict. Under the correct analysis, the jury hearing the content of Teresa’s

-54-

alleged threat would not have tipped the scales in Defendant’s favor or
otherwise changed the outcome of the proceeding. Indeed, Judge
Christiansen concluded that “hearing the specifics of the alleged threat”
would not have “ultimately have made a difference in the jury’s verdict.”
Scott, 2017 UT App 74, ¶¶43, 45 (Christiansen, J., concurring).4 The court of
appeals erroneously found that Defendant had proved prejudice.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of
appeals’ holding that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel. This Court should then reinstate Defendant’s conviction for murder
and remand the matter to the court of appeals to address Defendant’s
remaining verdict-urging instruction claim.

She nevertheless voted to reverse because “it is ‘not within the
province of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of a front
line fact-finder.’” Id. This clearly misstated the law. It is a reviewing court’s
duty to assess prejudice by predicting how a jury would have decided the
case. See Sears, 561 U.S. at 955-956 (explaining Strickland prejudice standard
“necessarily require[s] a court to ‘speculate’” as to how evidence would have
affected the outcome of the proceeding). After concluding that hearing the
specifics of the alleged threat would not have made a difference in the verdict,
Judge Christiansen should have dissented.
4
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